




Compensations in Information Collecting Situations
Tijs, S.H.; Timmer, J.B.; Brânzei, R.
Publication date:
2001
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Tijs, S. H., Timmer, J. B., & Brânzei, R. (2001). Compensations in Information Collecting Situations. (CentER
Discussion Paper; Vol. 2001-2). Microeconomics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.












Stef Tijs and Judith Timmer2
CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University,








How to compensate people who provide relevant information to a
decision-maker who faces uncertainty? This paper suggests some compen-
sation rules. These are studied both in a cooperative and a noncooperative
environment. JEL codes: C71, C72, D89.
Key Words: information collecting, games, core, Shapley value, equilibri-
um in dominant strategies.
1 Introduction
When dealing with decision-making under uncertainty, an agent can often con-
sult people who can give him information to reduce the uncertainty. But how
should he compensate his informants? This will be the main question of this
paper.
Information collecting situations are introduced in Brânzei, Tijs and Timmer
(2000a,b). In these situations a single decision-maker faces uncertainty, that is,
if all possible states of the world are represented by the set Ω then this decision-
maker does not know which state is the true one. Because his reward depends
on both the action he takes and the true state, consulting agents who can have
extra information is desirable.
The information of agent i is represented by a finite partition Ii of the set
Ω. An element of such a partition is called an event. If two states are in the
1We are indebted to Fioravante Patrone, Lorenzo Sacconi, Jacqueline Morgan and Andrea
Prattinelli for valuable comments on this topic.
2Corresponding author. This author acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) through project 613-304-059.
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same element of the partition then this agent cannot distinguish them. Let
Ii(ω) denote that element of Ii in which the state ω ∈ Ω lies. If ω is the true
state then agent i knows that the event Ii(ω) happens.
Concerning the true state we distinguish two situations. First, we consider
situations where the true state ω has obtained. The informants tell the decision-
maker that Ii(ω) happens. So, they provide ‘local’ information concerning the
true state. Based on this information the decision-maker takes an action and he
shares the resulting reward in some way with the informants. This is the topic
of the next section.
Second, if the true state has to obtain then the decision-maker starts again
by contacting the informants. He asks each of them to share their information
partition (‘global’ information) with him now and after the true state obtains
to tell in which part of their partition the true state lies. In exchange he pays
them for this information before the true state obtains. This payoff is based
on his expected reward obtained by using the global information. Finally, if
the true state obtains, the informants provide their local information to the
decision-maker, as was agreed. This information is used by the decision-maker
to take an action. We discuss this kind of situations in section 3.
In the sections 2 and 3 about local and global information, respectively, sug-
gestions for compensations are provided. These compensation rules are based on
the idea that an informant should receive (a part of) the marginal contribution
generated by his information.
Following this, section 4 studies information collecting (IC) situations in
a game-theoretical context. We define both cooperative and noncooperative
games related to IC situations. The cooperative (IC) games are already partly
studied in Brânzei, Tijs and Timmer (2000a,b). We show that one of the com-
pensation rules of section 2 coincides with the Shapley value (Shapley (1953))
of a particular game. For the noncooperative game we show that dividing the
total reward according to the compensation rule corresponds to the payoff of
an equilibrium in dominant strategies. An example shows that this need not
correspond to the payoff of a strong equilibrium.
The final section contains a brief study of the compensation rule in (coop-
erative) IC games.
2 Starting cooperation after the true state ob-
tains
An adventurer searches an island for a big treasure with lots of gold and jewels.
His treasure map says that this treasure can be found in one of the locations 1,
2, 3, or 4 but it fails to specify which one. The adventurer has no information
about the true location and gets one chance to guess the location of the treasure.
Fortunately he can consult three wise men. These men are located at the north,
southeast and southwest of the island, respectively. Each of them has some
information about the true location of the treasure. Hence, it will be good for
the adventurer to visit these wise men.
This is an example of a situation where a single decision-maker has to take
an action in an uncertain situation. Such situations can be modeled by a tuple
< N, k, (Ω,F , µ), {Ii}i∈N , Ak, rk > .
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Let agent k be the action taker. The set N is the set of all agents including k
who have some information about the true state ω. Ω is the set of all possible
states, F is a σ-algebra on Ω and µ a probability measure on Ω. The information
of player i is represented by Ii, a finite partition of Ω into F-measurable sets
with positive measure. The action taker chooses an action a from the set Ak
and if ω is the true state then his reward equals rk(ω, a).
If players in S share information then the global information of S is given
by
IS = {∩i∈SIi |Ii ∈ Ii, ∩i∈SIi 6= ∅} ,
the coarsest common refinement of the information partitions Ii, i ∈ S.
Let IS(ω) be that element of the partition IS that contains ω. If ω obtains









The reward function RI(ω) indicates that ω has obtained and therefore we only
consider IS(ω).
Example 2.1 The example at the beginning of this section can be modeled by
the tuple
< N, k, (Ω,F , µ), {Ii}i∈N , Ak, rk >
where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} is the set of wise men {1, 2, 3} together with the adven-
turer (decision-maker) k = 4. The treasure is hidden in one of the locations in
Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let F be the set containing all subsets of Ω. All locations are
equally likely for the adventurer and therefore µ(E) = |E|/4 for all E ∈ F .
The adventurer has no information about the true location, so I4 = {Ω}.
The wise men have the following information partitions: I1 = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}},
I2 = {{2}, {1, 3, 4}} and I3 = {{3}, {1, 2, 4}}. The adventurer has to guess the
location of the treasure. Thus A4 = {1, 2, 3, 4}. If ω ∈ Ω is the true location of
the treasure then the reward r4(ω, a) equals 1 if ω = a, that is, the adventurer
finds the treasure, and it equals 0 otherwise.
One way for agent k to collect information is to invite the other agents
one by one and to have them reveal their information Ii(ω). In this sequential
approach to collecting information, the decision-maker, agent k, starts with his








Let σ(1) ∈ N \ {k} be the first agent to be invited by agent k. The marginal
contribution of this agent, that is, the increase in reward obtained by using the
information of this agent, is
RI(ω)({k, σ(1)})−RI(ω)({k}).
Let Pσ(i) = {j ∈ N \ {k} | σ−1(j) < σ−1(i)} be the set of agents that are
invited before agent i. Now the marginal contribution of agent i in the order σ
when ω is the true state is
mσi (ω) = RI(ω)({k, i} ∪ Pσ(i)) − RI(ω)({k} ∪ Pσ(i)).
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Agent k might announce what the order of invitations is. In exchange for their
information, agent k pays the informants a fraction of their marginal contribu-
tion αim
σ
i (ω) with 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1. The remainder of the expected reward will be
for agent k himself.
Example 2.2 The adventurer announces that he will first visit wise man 1,
then 3 and finally 2. Thus he announces the order σ with σ(1) = 1, σ(2) = 3
and σ(3) = 2. Furthermore, he gives each wise man two-third of this marginal














2 (4) = 1/3. From RI(4)(N) = 1 there remains 1/2 for
the adventurer.
Suppose now that instead of announcing a fixed order σ, the decision-maker
does not tell which order σ will be used. He offers each informant a fraction of
his average marginal contribution
∑
σ∈Πk(N)
mσi (ω)/(n − 1)!, where Πk(N) is
the set of all orders σ on N \ {k}. Once again, all that remains of the expected
reward RI(ω)(N) is for agent k.
Example 2.3 If ω = 4 then the adventurer needs all three wise men to find
the treasure, no matter in what order he visits them. One can easily calcu-
late that mσσ(1)(4) = 1/12, m
σ
σ(2)(4) = 1/6 and m
σ
σ(3)(4) = 1/2 for any or-
der σ on {1, 2, 3}. It readily follows that the average marginal contribution is∑
σ∈Πk(N)
mσi (4)/3! = 1/4 for any wise man i. If these men receive two-third of
this contribution then any wise man receives 1/6 while the adventurer gets 1/2.
An alternative way of collecting information is the one-shot approach. The
name refers to the simultaneous revelation of information. The decision-maker
invites a group S of informants, S ⊂ N \ {k}, to share their information with
him. This information sharing results in the expected reward RI(ω)({k} ∪ S).
Agent k pays each of the informants a fraction of their marginal contribution
to the other selected agents and agent k. Thus if i is one of the selected agents
in S then he receives a fraction of
RI(ω)({k} ∪ S) −RI(ω)({k} ∪ S \ {i}).
Naturally, if an agent is not selected to share his information with the decision-
maker then he receives zero.
Example 2.4 The adventurer wants to visit the wise men 2 and 3. He pays
them two-third of their marginal contribution. Hence, wise man 2 receives
2
3
(RI(4)({2, 3, 4})−RI(4)({3, 4})) = 2/3(1/2− 1/3) = 1/9,
if the treasure is located at ω = 4. Wise man 3 also receives 1/9. Since wise
man 1 is not selected, he receives zero. The adventurer receives the remainder
RI(4)({2, 3, 4})− 1/9− 1/9 = 5/18.
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3 Starting cooperation before the true state ob-
tains
In the previous section we discussed information collecting situations where the
true state ω had already obtained, that is, where each coalition S of agents
knows that the event IS(ω) happens. But one can also think of situations
where the decision-maker has to decide with whom to cooperate before the
state ω obtains. Consequently, compensations for the informants will be based
on expected rewards. In this section we take a closer look at this kind of
situations. The following example is taken from Brânzei, Tijs and Timmer
(2000a).
Example 3.1 A fair die is thrown and agent 3 has the possibility to guess the
outcome or not to participate in this gamble. If this player makes a correct
guess then he receives 60, if he makes a wrong guess he has to pay 18. In
case he decides not to participate in this gamble his payoff is 0. Without extra
information this is not an attractive gamble for agent 3. There are however two
possible informants, the agents 1 and 2. Agent 1 is told whether the outcome of
the die is low or high, and agent 2 is told whether the outcome is odd or even.
We can model this as a tuple
< N, k, (Ω,F , µ), {Ii}i∈N , Ak, rk >
with N = {1, 2, 3}, agent k = 3 is the action taker, Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, F
contains all the subsets of Ω and µ(E) = |E|/6 for each E ∈ F . The information
partitions are I1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}, I2 = {{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 6}}, and I3 =
{Ω}. Agent 3’s action set is A3 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, n}, where n stands for not
participating in the gamble. The reward function is given by r3(ω, n) = 0 for all
ω ∈ Ω and for a ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}we have r3(ω, a) = 60 if a = ω and r3(ω, a) = −18
otherwise.









The subscript I in the reward function RI indicates that ω has not obtained and
therefore we use the whole information partition. This reward can be improved
upon by collecting information from the informants. For this, we can use the
same approaches as in the previous section.
First, there is the sequential approach to collecting information. The decision-
maker invites the informants one by one to share their information with him.
Each informant receives a fraction of his marginal contribution. This marginal
contribution may be interpreted as the marginal value of his information given
the information that is already known. If σ is the order in which the decision-
maker k invites the informants then the marginal contribution of agent i is







The decision-maker k keeps the remainder of RI(N) after he paid all the infor-
mants a fraction of their marginal contribution.
Instead of announcing a fixed order σ and paying the informants accord-




After these payments are done, the remainder of RI(N) will be for the decision-
maker.
Example 3.2 Consider the situation in example 3.1. Agent 3 decides to pay
the agents 1 and 2 half of their marginal contribution. Thus agent 1 receives
half of ∑
σ∈Πk(N)
mσ1 /2! = (8 + 26)/2 = 17
and agent 2 also receives 17/2. The remaining 17 of RI(N) = 34 is for agent 3.
Second, there is the one-shot approach. The decision-maker invites a group
S of agents to share their information with him. In exchange an informant i ∈ S
receives a fraction of his marginal contribution
RI({k} ∪ S) −RI({k} ∪ S \ {i}).
Agents that are not selected receive nothing. The decision-maker collects all
that remains of RI({k} ∪ S).
Example 3.3 With only two informants being present, there is not much to se-
lect for agent 3 in the previous example. Assume he selects both the informants
and gives them half of their marginal contribution
RI(N)− RI(N \ {i}) = 34− 8 = 26,
i = 1, 2. In this case the informants both receive 13 and agent 3 keeps the
remaining 8.
Besides working with expected values as the former two approaches do, we
may also keep the uncertainty as it is. This way we arrive at an IC-situation
with random payoffs. Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000) introduce a model to
analyse this kind of situations. In their model X(S) : Ω → IR+ is the random
payoff4 to coalition S of agents. In case of an information collecting situation,
these payoffs can be defined as follows. If the decision-maker k is not present in
the coalition S of agents, then X(S) = 0, that is, this coalition S receives the
payoff zero for sure. Otherwise, if the decision-maker is present, then we define
X(S)(ω) = RI(ω)(S)
for all ω ∈ Ω. The payoff X(S) takes the value X(S)(ω) with probability µ(ω).
Notice that the expected value of X(S) equals RI(S).
The example below illustrates this model with random payoffs.
4In Timmer et al. (2000) this payoff is denoted by R(S). To avoid confusion, we changed
it to X(S).
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Example 3.4 Consider once again the situation in example 3.1. We will cal-
culate the random payoffs corresponding to this IC situation.
Without agent 3 the informants cannot earn anything, so the correspond-
ing random payoffs are X({1}) = X({2}) = X({1, 2}) = 0. If agent 3 does
not consult the informants then the best thing for him to do is not to partici-
pate in this gamble, no matter what the outcome of the die would be. Hence,
X({3})(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, or equivalently X({3}) = 0. In a similar fashion
we obtain X({1, 3}) = X({2, 3}) = 8. Finally
X(N)(ω) =
{
21, ω ∈ {1, 3, 4, 6}
60, ω ∈ {2, 5}
is the random payoff in case all the agents work together.
4 Cooperative and noncooperative games
In this section we introduce two types of games arising from information collect-
ing situations. First we consider cooperative information collecting (IC) games.
Depending on whether or not ω is obtained at the moment of deciding with
whom to cooperate we arrive at respectively local IC games and (global) IC
games. This is done in the following subsection. Hereafter we turn our atten-
tion to noncooperative games. The decision-maker has to decide whom to work
with and the informants should decide whether to offer their information or
not. Once again depending upon ω being obtained or not, we arrive at so-called
local entry games or (global) entry games. These noncooperative games will be
introduced in subsection 4.2.
4.1 Information collecting games
A cooperative game (with transferable utility) is a pair (N, v) where N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} is the finite set of players and v is a function that assigns to any
coalition S ⊂ N a real number that represents the worth of this coalition. By
convention v(∅) = 0.
Local information collecting (IC) games are cooperative games that corre-
spond to IC situations where ω has already obtained, as discussed in section 2.
These local IC games are introduced and studied in Brânzei, Tijs and Timmer
(2000b). Let
< N, k, (Ω,F , µ), {Ii}i∈N , Ak, rk >
be an IC situation and assume that ω ∈ Ω has obtained. The corresponding
local IC game (N, vω,k) is defined as follows. The player set N is the set of all
the informants and the decision-maker. Let S ⊂ N be a coalition of players.
If the decision-maker k is not a member of this coalition then vω,k(S) = 0.
Otherwise







If ω has not obtained then we arrive at (global) IC games, which are introduced
in Brânzei, Tijs and Timmer (2000a). Given an IC situation the corresponding
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IC game (N, vk) is defined by vk(∅) = 0, vk(S) = 0 if k /∈ S and








if k ∈ S. Closely related to this game is the game (N \ {k}, v−k,α) with
v−k,α(S) = α(vk(S ∪ {k})− vk({k}))
for all S ⊂ N\{k}. The player set of this game is the set of all informants and the
value v−k,α(S) of a group S of informants is a fraction α of its contribution to the
decision-maker k. This game is useful in determining the payoff of an informant
if ω has to obtain and if the decision-maker uses the sequential approach without
announcing a fixed order σ. It turns out that this payoff coincides with the
Shapley value φ (Shapley (1953)) of the game (N \ {k}, v−k,α).
Theorem 4.1 If αi = α for all i ∈ N \ {k} then αi
∑
σ∈Πk(N)
mσi /(n − 1)! =
φi(v−k,α).
Proof. Let αi = α for all i ∈ N \ {k} and let σ ∈ Πk(N). Then
mσi (v−k,α) = v−k,α({i} ∪ Pσ(i)) − v−k,α(Pσ(i))
= α(vk({i, k} ∪ Pσ(i)) − vk({k} ∪ Pσ(i)))
= αmσi .












where the last equality follows from the definition of the Shapley value.
The marginal contribution of informant i to S \ {i}, i ∈ S, is
RI(S) −RI(S \ {i}).
An IC situation satisfies the decreasing marginals property if each informant i
contributes more to a smaller group than to a larger group, that is,
RI(S) − RI(S \ {i}) ≥ RI(T )− RI(T \ {i}) (1)
for all i ∈ N \ {k} and all S, T with i, k ∈ S ⊂ T ⊂ N . Denote by DMk the set
of IC situations that satisfy (1). Define Mi(S, vk) = vk(S) − vk(S \ {i}) as the
marginal contribution of player i ∈ S to S \ {i}. Notice that Mi(S, vk) ≥ 0. IC
situations in DMk lead to games (N, vk) that satisfy
Mi(S, vk) ≥Mi(T, vk) (2)
for all i ∈ N and i, k ∈ S ⊂ T ⊂ N . This is the so-called k-concavity property.
Brânzei, Tijs and Timmer (2000b) show that (2) is equivalent to the total union
property, defined by





for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N with k ∈ S. If (N, vk) is the IC game corresponding to an




∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ xi ≤Mi(N, vk), i ∈ N \ {k};∑
i∈N xi = vk(N)
}
(4)
is the core of this game (cf. Muto, Nakayama, Potters and Tijs (1988)).
4.2 Entry games
Entry games are noncooperative games in strategic form derived from informa-
tion collecting situations. A game in strategic form is a tuple (N, (Xi, ui)i∈N )
where N is the player set. Each player i ∈ N has a set Xi of strategies and a
payoff function ui that assigns to each vector x = (xi)i∈N of strategies a real
number ui(x).
Let
< N, k, (Ω,F , µ), {Ii}i∈N , Ak, rk >
be an IC situation and assume that ω ∈ Ω has obtained. The corresponding
local entry game Eαk,ω for α ∈ [0, 1]
N\{k} is the tuple (N, (Xi, ui)i∈N ) with N the
set of informants and the decision-maker k. This decision-maker selects a group
of agents with whom he wants to cooperate. His strategy set is Xk = 2
N\{k}.
An informant i can choose whether to ’enter’ or not, where ’enter’ stands for
providing information to the decision-maker. Hence, Xi = {0, 1}, i ∈ N \ {k},
where 1 means ’enter’ and 0 means ’do not enter’.
Let x = (xi)i∈N be a strategy profile with xi ∈ Xi. Those informants that
are selected by player k and are willing to cooperate, form together with the
decision-maker the set of players S(x) that will cooperate:
S(x) = {i ∈ xk | xi = 1} ∪ {k}.
The payoff to informant i equals
ui(x) =
{
0 , i /∈ S(x),
αi[RI(ω)(S(x)) − RI(ω)(S(x) \ {i})] , i ∈ S(x).
If informant i is not selected by k or if he does not want to enter, then he
receives a payoff of zero. Otherwise he receives the fraction αi of his marginal
contribution to the other players in S(x) \ {i}.
The decision-maker receives all that remains of the total reward:




It may also be the case that ω has not yet obtained. Now we define a corre-
sponding (global) entry game Eαk with α ∈ [0, 1]
N\{k}. This game is represented
by the tuple (N, (Xi, ui)i∈N ) where N and Xi, i ∈ N , have the same meaning
as before. The payoff functions change because ω is not known yet. For an
informant i we have
ui(x) =
{
0 , i /∈ S(x)
αi[RI(S(x)) − RI(S(x) \ {i})] , i ∈ S(x).
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Once again, if informant i is not selected by the decision-maker or if he does not
want to enter then his payoff will be zero. Otherwise, he receives the fraction αi
of his marginal contribution to S(x) \ {i} in case ω has not yet obtained. The
remainder




goes to the decision-maker k.
Notice that, using IC games, there is an easier way to write the payoff
function. Let (N, vk) be an IC game that corresponds to the same IC situation
as the game Eαk . Recall that
Mj(S, vk) = vk(S) − vk(S \ {j}) = RI(S) −RI(S \ {j}).
Then we can write for all informants i
ui(x) =
{
0 , i /∈ S(x),
αiMi(S(x), vk) , i ∈ S(x)
and




for the decision-maker. Similar things can be done for local IC games and local
entry games.
Let x̄ be the strategy profile where the decision-maker k selects all the infor-
mants, i.e. x̄k = N \ {k}, and every informant wants to enter, i.e. x̄i = 1 for all
i ∈ N \ {k}. This strategy profile is an equilibrium in dominant strategies (cf.
Van Damme (1987)) of the game Eαk if this game corresponds to an IC situation
in DMk .
Theorem 4.2 For all α ∈ [0, 1]N\{k} and all games Eαk corresponding to an IC
situation in DMk, x̄ is an equilibrium in dominant strategies.
Proof. Let α ∈ [0, 1]N\{k} and let i ∈ N \{k}. First, take x−i ∈ Πj∈N\{i}Xj
and xi ∈ Xi. We show that ui(x−i, x̄i) ≥ ui(x−i, xi).
If i /∈ xk then ui(x−i, x̄i) = 0 = ui(x−i, xi). Otherwise, if i ∈ xk then define
S = {j ∈ xk|xj = 1}. Now
ui(x−i, x̄i) = αiMi(S ∪ {k}, vk)
{
= ui(x−i, xi), xi = 1
≥ ui(x−i, xi) = 0, xi = 0.
Next, let x−k ∈ Πj∈N\{k}Xj and xk ∈ Xk. Define S̄ = {i ∈ x̄k|xi = 1}. Note
that S̄ ⊃ S because x̄k = N \ {k} ⊃ xk. We derive the following.
uk(x−k, xk) = vk(S ∪ {k})−
∑
i∈S
αiMi(S ∪ {k}, vk)
≤ vk(S ∪ {k})−
∑
i∈S
αiMi(S ∪ {k}, vk) +
∑
i∈S̄\S
(1− αi)Mi(S̄ ∪ {k}, vk)
≤ vk(S ∪ {k})−
∑
i∈S
αiMi(S̄ ∪ {k}, vk) +
∑
i∈S̄\S
(1− αi)Mi(S̄ ∪ {k}, vk)
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= vk(S ∪ {k}) +
∑
i∈S̄\S
Mi(S̄ ∪ {k}, vk)−
∑
i∈S̄
αiMi(S̄ ∪ {k}, vk)
≤ vk(S̄ ∪ {k})−
∑
i∈S̄
αiMi(S̄ ∪ {k}, vk)
= uk(x−k, x̄k).
The first inequality follows from Mi(T, vk) ≥ 0 for all i and all T ⊃ {i, k}. The
second and the third inequality follow from (2) and (3), respectively.
One may wonder whether x̄ is a strong equilibrium, that is, whether
u(x̄−S, xS) ≤ u(x̄)
for all coalitions S. The following example shows that this is not true.
Example 4.1 Consider the situation in example 3.1 but assume now that both
the informants are told whether the outcome is lower than 4 or higher than
3. The corresponding IC game is the game (N, v3) with v3(∅) = v3({1}) =
v3({2}) = v3({1, 2}) = 0, v3({3}) = 0, v3({1, 3}) = v3({2, 3}) = v3(N) = 8.
This game belongs to DM3.
Now consider the corresponding entry gameEαk with α ∈ [0, 1]
{1,2}. Strategy
profile x̄ with x̄1 = x̄2 = 1 and x̄3 = {1, 2} is not a strong equilibrium. We will
show why not. The payoffs corresponding to this strategy profile are
u1(x̄) = u2(x̄) = 0, u3(x̄) = v3(N) = 8
because Mi(N, v3) = 0 for i = 1, 2; both informants have the same informa-
tion and therefore their marginal contribution equals zero. Suppose that the
informants 1 and 2 deviate together to the strategies x1 = 0 and x2 = 1. Now
0 = u1(x1, x2, x̄3) = u1(x̄)
because 1 decided not to enter but
u2(x1, x2, x̄3) = α2M2({2, 3}, v3)
= α2(v3({2, 3})− v3({3}))
= α2 · 8
> 0 = u2(x̄)
if α2 > 0. Hence, x̄ is not a strong equilibrium.
To conclude this section we show that core-elements of a game associated
to an IC situation in DMk are closely related to equilibria in the related entry
game Eαk .
Theorem 4.3 Let B ∈ DMk be an IC situation with related IC game (N, vk)
and entry games Eαk , α ∈ [0, 1]
N\{k}. Then for all x ∈ C(vk) there is an
α ∈ [0, 1]N\{k} such that x is a vector of equilibrium payoffs corresponding to
an equilibrium in dominant strategies of the game Eαk .
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Proof. Let x ∈ C(vk). According to (4) we have 0 ≤ xi ≤Mi(N, vk), i 6= k,
and xk = vk(N) −
∑
i∈N\{k} xi. Because of this there exists an α ∈ [0, 1]
N\{k}
such that xi = αiMi(N, vk) for all i ∈ N \ {k}. Let x̄ be the strategy profile
defined by x̄i = 1, i 6= k, and x̄k = N \ {k}. According to theorem 4.2 x̄ is an
equilibrium in dominant strategies of the game Eαk . The equilibrium payoffs are
ui(x̄) = xi, for i 6= k, and uk(x̄) = xk.
5 Marginal based allocation rules
In the previous section we often used the following rule to divide the total
reward over the decision-maker k and the informants i ∈ N \{k}. An informant
i receives αiMi(N, vk), a fraction of his marginal contribution to N \ {i}. After
we have done so for all the informants, the remainder goes to the decision-
maker, who thus receives vk(N) −
∑
i∈N\{k} αiMi(N, vk). We call these rules
that depend upon α ∈ [0, 1]N\{k}marginal based allocation rules. The remainder
of this section is devoted to studying properties of these rules.
Let (N, vk) be an IC game corresponding to an IC situation with decision-




∣∣∣∣ ∃α ∈ [0, 1]N\{k} : xi = αiMi(N, vk),i ∈ N \ {k}; ∑j∈N xj = vk(N)
}
the set of all marginal based allocation rules in this game. This set contains the
core of (N, vk), that is, it is a so-called core catcher.
Theorem 5.1 A(vk) ⊃ C(vk) for all IC games (N, vk).
Proof. Let (N, vk) be an IC game. Then vk(S) = 0 if k /∈ S. Let x ∈ C(vk).







xj ≤ vk(N) − vk(N \ {i}) = Mi(N, vk).
Hence there exists an αi ∈ [0, 1] such that xi = αiMi(N, vk). The core-condition∑
j∈N xj = vk(N) implies xk = vk(N)−
∑
i∈N\{k} αiMi(N, vk).





for all S ⊂ N with k ∈ S, then A(vk) and C(vk) coincide.
Theorem 5.2 A(vk) = C(vk) for all IC games (N, vk) that satisfy (5).
Proof. In theorem 5.1 we have shown A(vk) ⊃ C(vk). It remains to show
A(vk) ⊂ C(vk).
Let x ∈ A(vk) and let αx ∈ [0, 1]N\{k} be such that xi = αxiMi(N, vk) for
i 6= k. First, x satisfies
∑
j∈N xj = vk(N). Second, we show that
∑
j∈S xj ≥
vk(S) for all nonempty coalitions S.
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αxjMj(N, vk) ≥ 0 = vk(S).


















with the first inequality following from Mj(N, vk) ≥ 0 and the second one from
(5). We conclude that x ∈ C(vk).
The theorems 5.1 and 5.2 have some similarities with the results in Monderer,
Samet and Shapley (1992). There the set of weighted values is a core catcher
and it coincides with the core if the game is convex. Our results are that the
set A(vk) of marginal based allocation rules is a core catcher and it coincides
with the core in case vk is a big boss game.
An IC game (N, vk) is a so-called total big boss game if it satisfies




for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N with k ∈ S. Hence, (5) is satisfied and A(vk) = C(vk)
according to theorem 5.2. One particular core-element is given by Muto et al.
(1988) who show that for total big boss games the τ -value (cf. Tijs (1981)) and
the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler (1969)) coincide and are equal to the marginal
based allocation rule with αi = 1/2 for all i ∈ N \ {k}.
Sprumont (1990) introduces population monotonic allocation schemes, or
pmas in short. Define Pk to be the set {S ⊂ N | k ∈ S} of coalitions containing
the decision-maker k. A scheme [ai,S]i∈S,S∈Pk is a pmas if∑
i∈S
ai,S = vk(S) and ai,S ≤ ai,T
for all S, T ∈ Pk with S ⊂ T . Brânzei, Tijs and Timmer (2000b) define bi-
monotonic allocation schemes (bi-mas) for k-concave IC games. So, (2) is sat-
isfied. A scheme [bi,S]i∈S,S∈Pk is a bi-mas if
(bi,S)i∈S ∈ C(S, vk), bk,S ≤ bk,T and bi,S ≥ bi,T
for all i ∈ S \ {k} and S, T ∈ Pk with S ⊂ T . Hence, in a bi-mas the decision-
maker k gains if more informants cooperate, while the informants are better
off with fewer informants cooperating. Brânzei, Tijs and Timmer (2000b) show
that for a game (N, vk) corresponding to an IC situation in DMk we can extend
any x ∈ C(vk) to a bi-mas. That is, there exists a bi-mas [bi,S]i∈S,S∈Pk such
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that xj = bj,N for all j ∈ N . A similar result concerning pmas holds for IC
games (N, vk) that satisfy




for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N with k ∈ S.
Theorem 5.3 For all IC games (N, vk) that satisfy (6) we can extend each
core-element x to a pmas.
Proof. Let (N, vk) be an IC game satisfying (6) and let x ∈ C(vk). Because
(6) implies (5), it follows from theorem 5.2 that xi = αiMi(N, vk), i ∈ N \ {k},
and xk = vk(N) −
∑
i∈N\{k}αiMi(N, vk) for an α ∈ [0, 1]
N\{k}. Define the
allocation scheme [ai,S]i∈S,S∈Pk by ai,S = αiMi(N, vk) for all i ∈ S \ {k},
S ∈ Pk, and




for all S ∈ Pk. Now xj = aj,N for all j ∈ N . Further, it is obvious that∑
i∈S ai,S = vk(S) for all S ∈ Pk. Next, let S, T ∈ Pk with i ∈ S ⊂ T . Then
ai,S = αiMi(N, vk) = ai,T
for all i ∈ S \ {k} and
















where the inequality follows from (6). Hence, [ai,S ]i∈S,S∈Pk is a pmas.
To conclude this section we want to discuss a special kind of consistency
of marginal based allocation rules specific for IC situations. Hence, we call it
IC consistency. Consider an IC situation with corresponding IC game (N, vk).
The total reward vk(N) will be divided according to a marginal based allocation
rule for some α ∈ [0, 1]N\{k}. Suppose that the group S of informants takes
their payoffs (αiMi(N, vk))i∈S and leaves. Just before leaving they gave their
information to the decision-maker k. The reduced IC situation that arises is the
following:
< N \ S, k, (Ω,F , µ), {I∗i }i∈N\S , Ak, r
∗
k >,
where I∗i = Ii for all i 6= k, I
∗
k = I{k}∪S and r
∗
k = rk −
∑
i∈S αiMi(N, vk).
Let (N \ S, v∗k) be the corresponding IC game. We say that a marginal based
allocation rule is IC consistent if for all S ⊂ N \ {k}
αiMi(N \ S, v
∗
k) = αiMi(N, vk) (7)
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for all i ∈ N \ S, i 6= k, an informant receives the same after the group S has
left, and if
v∗k(N \ S) −
∑
i∈N\(S∪{k})
αiMi(N \ S, v
∗




are satisfied. The latter equality says that the payoff of the decision-maker is
not influenced by the absence of the group S of informants.
Theorem 5.4 The marginal based allocation rules are IC consistent.
Proof. Let α ∈ [0, 1]N\{k} and let S ⊂ N \ {k} be a group of informants
that has left. Notice that




for all Q ⊂ N \ S. Let i ∈ N \ S, i 6= k. Now




k(N \ S) − v
∗
k(N \ (S ∪ {i}))]
= αi[vk(N) − vk(N \ {i})]
= αiMi(N, vk).
Equation (7) is satisfied. Using this, we obtain
v∗k(N \ S) −
∑
i∈N\(S∪{k})














We conclude that (8) is also satisfied.
An interesting question for future research is whether the marginal based
allocation rules can be axiomatized with the help of IC consistency.
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